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Abstract
By incorporating market impact and momentum traders into an agent-based
model, we investigate the conditions for the occurrence of self-reinforcing
feedback loops and the coevolutionary mechanism of prices and strategies.
For low market impact, the price fluctuations are originally large. The exis-
tence of momentum traders has little impact on the change of price fluctu-
ations but destroys the equilibrium between the trend-following and trend-
rejecting strategies. The trend-following herd behaviors become dominant.
A self-reinforcing feedback loop exists. For high market impact, the exis-
tence of momentum traders leads to an increase in price fluctuations. The
trend-following strategies of rational individuals are suppressed while the
trend-following strategies of momentum traders are promoted. The crowd-
anticrowd behaviors become dominant. A negative feedback loop exists. A
theoretical analysis indicates that, for low market impact, the majority ef-
fect is beneficial for the trend-followers to earn more, which in turn promotes
the trend-following strategies. For high market impact, the minority effect
causes the trend-followers to suffer great losses, which in turn suppresses the
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trend-following strategies.
Keywords: econophysics, trading efficiency, momentum traders,
self-reinforcing feedback
1. Introduction
Bubbles and crashes occasionally occur in real estate and financial mar-
kets, which can swallow years of individual savings and trigger economic
recessions [1, 2]. Empirical analyses show that positive feedbacks give a driv-
ing force for the growth of speculative bubbles in financial markets and cause
unsustainable growth of the housing prices [3, 4, 5, 6]. The individuals who
are interested in fast gains can promote the self-reinforcing imitation, which
finally leads to the speculative herding and the short-term price momentum
and long-term price reversal [7, 8, 9, 38].
In the last two decades, the world has witnessed the booming growth of
bounded rationality and behavioural finance theory (BFT) [11, 12, 13], which
is one of the strongest challenges to the efficient market hypothesis (EMH).
Different from the EMH, the BFT attributes the irrational behaviors in finan-
cial markets to cognitive biases. Bloomfield et al. have investigated rational
cognition and cognitive biases on price movement. The price fluctuations
were found to be closely related to the degree of risk preference [11, 12].
Kukacka et al. have examined the direct impact of herding, overconfidence,
and market sentiment in financial market [14]. The behavioural patterns were
found to be quite important for the evolution of prices. The stock prices are
quite possible to overreact or underreact to the news, which can be explained
by the behavioral biases like over-confidence or risk-aversion [8, 15, 16].
In exploring the evolutionary dynamics in financial markets, a variety of
agent-based models have been borrowed to mimic the stock price movement
[17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23]. The most relevant models are the Ising models,
the herding models and the minority game models [24, 25, 26, 9, 38, 27, 28,
29, 30, 31], which can reproduce some of the stylized facts found in realistic
markets [32, 33, 34]. By incorporating herding, external news and private
information into a dynamical Ising-like model, the stylized facts of financial
markets have been reproduced [25]. The seminal work of Mike and Farmer
proposes an empirical behavioral model based on the empirical regularities at
the trade level [32], which has been further improved by including long-range
correlations in relative prices and price limit rules [33, 34]. These models
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have been applied to study the micro mechanisms causing macro properties
[35, 36, 37, 38]. A behavioral model has been proposed to mimick the stock
price formation, it can successfully reproduce the distribution of returns, the
well-known power-law tails, some other important stylized facts [35].
Until today, in relation to the role of behavioural biases in investment,
some empirical findings indicate that they help the investors earn more while
other empirical findings indicate that they cause the investors to suffer a
loss[2, 3]. Both the efficient market hypothesis and the behavioral finance
theory can explain part of these phenomena. Whether the contradictory
scenarios can coexist or not and how the rational and irrational behaviors
can be coupled together are still open questions.
Following the work done by bloomfield and Yeung et al.[11, 27], in the
present work, we incorporate market impact and momentum traders into
an agent-based model. The conditions for the occurrence of self-reinforcing
feedback loops and the coevolutionary mechanism of stock prices and indi-
vidual strategies are extensively investigated. We have the following three
main findings.
(1) The effects of momentum traders on price fluctuations are determined
by the market impact. As the market impact is low, the price fluctuations
are quite large even if there are no momentum traders. The existence of
momentum traders has little impact on the change of price fluctuations. As
the market impact is high, the price fluctuations are quite small when there
are no momentum traders. The existence of momentum traders leads to an
increase in the price fluctuations.
(2) The self-reinforcing feedback loop only exists within the range where
the market impact is low. For low market impact, the trend-following strate-
gies of momentum traders are imitated by rational individuals. The trend-
following herd behavior occurs easily. For high market impact, the trend-
following strategies of momentum traders are rejected by rational individ-
uals. The trend-rejecting strategies of rational individuals coexist with the
trend-following strategies of momentum traders.
(3) A theoretical analysis indicates that the trend-following or trend-
rejecting behavior results from the gains or losses in the investment. As the
market impact is low, the individuals adopting the trend-following strategy
are easy to be in the majority side and gain more, which in turn attracts
more rational individuals to adopt the trend-following strategy. As the mar-
ket impact is high, the trend-rejecting strategy accompanied by the trend-
following strategy are easy to be in the minority side, which in turn leads to
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the coexistence of the trend-rejecting strategies of rational individuals and
the trend-following strategies of momentum traders.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the evolutionary minority
game with market impact and momentum traders is introduced. In section
3, the numerical results are presented. In section 4, a theoretical analysis is
given. In section 5, some valuable conclusions are drawn.
2. The model
The price formation is related to the dependence of return on trade vol-
ume. The price impact against the transaction size has been investigated
in refs. [39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44]. A uniform price-impact curve suitable for
different markets has been investigated, the power-law dependence of the re-
turn on the size has been found [39, 40]. The empirically estimated exponent
ranges from 1
3
to 2
3
[41, 42, 43, 44].
Following the work done in refs. [42, 43], in the present model, we in-
troduce a variable ξ as the power-law price impact. The time-dependent
evolution of stock prices is satisfied with the equation
P (t+ 1) = P (t)e
ηsign[A(t)]|A(t)|ξ
N , (1)
in which A(t) =
∑N
i=1 ai(t) and ai(t) is an individual i
′s decision, buying
(+1), selling (-1) or taking no action (0). ξ ranges from 0 to 1 and η is a
pregiven constant. If there are more buyers than sellers, A(t) is greater than
zero and the price increases. If there are more sellers than buyers, A(t) is
less than zero and the price decreases.
Consider a stock market with γN momentum traders and (1−γ)N ratio-
nal individuals, γ ∈ [0, 1]. For a rational individual i, he makes his decision
according to his strategy gi ∈ [0, 1]. Facing a m-bit long history indicating
the rise and fall of the latest prices, he follows the historical prediction with
probability gi and rejects the historical prediction with probability 1 − gi.
For example, facing a price history ↑↑↑↑↑, if the historical prediction is ↓,
rational individual i sells the stock with probability gi on condition that he
has a stock in his hand and buys the stock with probability 1 − gi on con-
dition that he has no stock in his hand. Or else, he takes no action. For a
momentum trader j, he acts as a trend-follower when some typical history
occurs. For example, facing a continuous rise of the stock prices, ↑↑↑ or ↑↑↑↑,
on condition that momentum trader j has no stock in his hand, he buys the
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stock no matter what the historical prediction is. Facing a continuous fall of
the stock prices, ↓↓↓ or ↓↓↓↓, on condition that he has a stock in his hand,
he sells the stock no matter what the historical prediction is. Or else, he acts
as a rational individual.
Strategy g evolves according to the strategy score D and the updating
threshold Dth,
D =
tlatest∑
t=tupdate
[Ptr(tsell)− Ptr(tbuy)], (2)
in which D is the accumulated wealth received after the new strategy has
been adopted and Ptr is the transaction price. On condition that Di < Dth,
individual i modifies his strategy gi and gets a new strategy randomly from
the range of [gi −
λ
2
, gi +
λ
2
], λ ∈ [0, 1].
The market impact is incorporated into the transaction price Ptr with
parameter β [27],
Ptr(t) = (1− β)P (t) + βP (t+ 1), (3)
in which 0 ≤ β ≤ 1. For β = 0, Ptr(t) = P (t), the individuals make a
transaction according to the latest price. For β = 1, Ptr(t) = P (t + 1), the
individuals make a transaction according to the next price.
The wealth of an individual i is accumulated from the beginning of the
game,
Wi =
tmax∑
t=1
∆Wi(t), (4)
in which ∆W = Ptr(tsell)−Ptr(tbuy). The averaged wealth of the population
is
W¯ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Wi. (5)
The predictability is used to measure the mean value of the change in
price as some typical history occurs, which is defined as [27]
H =
∑
χ
ρ(χ)〈∆P |χ〉2, (6)
5
in which ρ(χ) is the probability that history χ occurs and 〈∆P |χ〉 is the
mean value of the change in price on condition that history χ occurs.
The probability distribution is often used to find the empirical character-
istics of a series of data. Given a time-dependent series of price P (t), t=1,
2, 3, ... , tmax, tmax + 1. The return is r(t) = lnP (t + 1) − lnP (t). The
normalized return is R(t) = r(t)/|r|max, in which |r|max is the maximal value
of absolute return. In real financial markets, the positive and negative tails
of the probability distribution of stock returns is about 3 [45].
The detrended fluctuation analysis (DFA) method is often used to quan-
tify the long-range correlations in signals [46, 47]. In financial markets, the
DFA method is often applied to find the empirical characteristics of stock
prices [48, 49, 50]. Given a time-dependent series of variable x(t), t=1, 2, 3,
... , tmax, tmax+1. It is integrated as y(k) =
∑k
i=1[x(i)−xave], in which x(i)
is the ith value and xave is the average value. The integrated series is divided
into n boxes and the length of each box is S. The detrended series of y(k) is
y(k)− ys(k), in which ys(k) is the local trend of the detrended series in each
box. The root-mean-square of y(k) is F (S) =
√∑S
k=1[y(k)−ys(k)]2
S
. The rela-
tionship between F (S) and S, F (S) ∼ Sh, can be understood as follows. For
h < 0.5, the series is satisfied with a short-term correlation. For h = 0.5, the
series is a random walk. For h > 0.5, the series is satisfied with a long-range
correlation.
In real financial markets, the trend-following momentum traders are found
here and there. For example, during a bull market, some investors rush into
the market no matter what a fundamental analysis is. During a bear market,
some investors run away from the market no matter what a rational analyst
tells them to do. The momentum trading strategy is frequently used in
security investment [51, 52]. How the existence of momentum traders disturb
the originally rational population should be especially examined.
3. Simulation results and discussions
3.1. Stylized facts of stock returns and stock return volatilities
Some empirical studies on real market data have shown that the stock
price movement exhibits some stylized facts such as the fat-tails of return
distribution, no memory in return and long-range autocorrelation in return
volatilities [20, 33, 35, 53]. In the following, we firstly examine whether the
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Figure 1: (a) The distribution P (R) of normalized stock returns; (b) the distribution
P (| R |) of absolute normalized stock returns for market impact β = 1.0 and the ratio
of momentum traders γ= 0.15 (circles). Other parameters are: the total number of indi-
viduals N = 1001, the memory size m = 5, the updating threshold Dth = 0, the drift of
strategy λ = 0.1, the exponent ξ = 1, the constant η = 10. Final results are averaged over
10 runs and 104 times after 105 relaxation times in each run.
proposed model can reproduce some of the well-known stylized facts found
in real financial markets.
In fig. 1 (a) we plot the distribution P (R) of normalized stock returns.
It is noted that, compared with a normal distribution, P (R) has a relatively
fat tail. In fig. 1 (b) we plot the distribution P (| R |) of simulation data
and draw a best fit line with double logarithmic approximation. A power-
law distribution with an exponent α ∼ 3.1775 is observed. Such a result is
in accordance with the empirical findings in refs. [35, 53], where both the
positive and negative tails are about α ∼ 3.
In fig. 2 (a) we plot the root mean square fluctuation F (S) of stock
returns depending upon the DFA method. It is noted that, compared with
the case where there are no momentum traders, an increase in the ratio γ
of momentum traders leads to an increase in the hurst exponent h of stock
returns. As we draw a best fit line to the simulation data, the hurst exponent
is found to be h ∼ 0.49061 for γ = 0.1 and h ∼ 0.53439 for γ = 0.15. Such
a result is in accordance with the empirical findings in refs. [20, 33], where
the hurst exponent of stock returns is about h ∼ 0.5.
In fig. 2 (b) we plot the root mean square fluctuation F (S) of absolute
stock returns depending upon the DFA method. The hurst exponent of
absolute stock returns is found to be h ∼ 0.75638 for γ = 0.1 and h ∼ 0.75417
for γ = 0.15. Such a result is in accordance with the empirical findings in
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Figure 2: (a) DFA of stock returns; (b) DFA of absolute stock returns for the market
impact β = 1.0 and the ratio of momentum traders γ= 0.1 (circles), 0.15 (squares). Other
parameters are: the total number of individuals N = 1001, the memory size m = 5, the
updating thresholdDth = 0, the drift of strategy λ = 0.1, the exponent ξ = 1, the constant
η = 10. Final results are averaged over 10 runs and 104 times after 105 relaxation times
in each run.
refs. [45, 48, 49, 50], where the hurst exponent of stock return volatilities is
between h ∼ 0.5 and h ∼ 1.
The above simulation results indicate that the characteristics of power-
law distribution of stock returns, no memory in stock return and long-range
autocorrelation of stock return volatilities can be reproduced in the present
model, which implies that the stylized facts in empirical findings could orig-
inate from the existence of momentum traders and typical market impact.
The effect of heterogeneous investors on price movement has also been dis-
cussed in refs. [14, 18, 19, 51, 52]. In the present model, the existence of a
small amount of momentum traders coupled with variable market impact is
in favor of reproducing more diversified financial markets.
3.2. Coevolutionary dynamics of individual strategies and price movement
In the present work, the self-reinforcing feedback loop is defined as fol-
lows. An individual acts according to his subjective perception to the market
movement. If his perception is confirmed, his strategy will be imitated by
more people and herd behavior occurs. The collective action further confirms
the correctness of his subjective perception and his strategy becomes a dom-
inant strategy. Accordingly, the negative feedback loop can also be defined
here. An individual acts according to his subjective perception to the market
movement. If the market moves contrary to his perception, his strategy will
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Figure 3: The standard deviation σP of stock prices (a) as a function of the market
impact β for the ratio of momentum traders γ=0 (circles), 0.2 (squares), 0.4 (diamonds),
0.6 (triangles), 0.8 (pluses), 1.0 (stars); (b) as a function of the ratio of momentum traders
γ for the market impact β=0 (circles), β=1.0 (squares). Other parameters are: the total
number of individuals N = 1001, the memory size m = 5, the updating threshold Dth = 0,
the drift of strategy λ = 0.1, the exponent ξ = 1, the constant η = 10. Final results are
averaged over 100 runs and 104 times after 105 relaxation times in each run.
be rejected by other people. The trend-following behavior coexists with the
trend-rejecting behavior. The crowd-anticrowd strategy becomes a dominant
strategy.
In the following, we firstly investigate the coevolutionary dynamics of
individual strategies and price movement and then examine the conditions
for the occurrence of self-reinforcing feedback loop in the present model.
Figure 3 (a) shows the standard deviation σP of stock prices as a function
of the market impact β for different ratio of momentum traders γ. As there
are no momentum traders, σP is quite large within the range of β < 0.5 and
is relatively small within the range of β > 0.5. A transition point β ∼ 0.5
is observed. The dependence of σP on γ is related to β. For β < 0.5, an
increase in γ has little impact on σP . For β > 0.5, an increase in γ leads to
an increase in σP .
Figure 3 (b) shows the dependence of σP on γ for β = 0 and β = 1
respectively. For β = 0, σP is insensitive to the change of γ within the range
of 0 ≤ γ < 0.82 and increases continuously from σP ∼ 45 to σP ∼ 230 within
the range of 0.82 < γ ≤ 1. For β = 1, σP is sensitive to the change of γ and
increases continuously from σP ∼ 1.6 to σP ∼ 320.
In order to know about whether a large fluctuation in stock prices results
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Figure 4: The predictability H of stock prices (a) as a function of the market impact
β for the ratio of momentum traders γ=0 (circles), 0.2 (squares), 0.4 (diamonds), 0.6
(triangles), 0.8 (pluses), 1.0 (stars); (b) as a function of the ratio of momentum traders γ
for the market impact β=0 (circles) and 1.0 (squares). Other parameters are: the total
number of individuals N = 1001, the memory size m = 5, the updating threshold Dth = 0,
the drift of strategy λ = 0.1, the exponent ξ = 1, the constant η = 10. Final results are
averaged over 100 runs and 104 times after 105 relaxation times in each run.
from its high predictability, in fig. 4 (a) and (b) we plot the predictability
H as a function of the market impact β and the ratio of momentum traders
γ respectively. Similar to the changing tendency of σp vs γ in fig. 3, for
β = 0, H is insensitive to the change of γ within the range of 0 ≤ γ < 0.82
and increases continuously from H ∼ 102 to H ∼ 105 within the range of
0.82 < γ ≤ 1. For β = 1, H is sensitive to the change of γ and increases
continuously from H ∼ 0.6 to H ∼ 1.5× 105.
Comparing the results in fig. 4 with the results fig. 3, we find that the
larger the price fluctuation is, the more predictable the price trend is.
In the present model, the stock prices coevolve with the strategies. In
order to find out the coevolutionary mechanism of individual strategies and
stock prices, in fig. 5 we plot the standard deviation σg of strategies as a
function of the market impact β for different ratio of momentum traders
γ. It is noted that the evolutionary behaviors of rational individuals and
momentum traders are quite different from each other. Within the range of
β < 0.5, whether for rational individuals or momentum traders, σg changes
little with the rise of γ. Within the range of of β > 0.5, an increase in γ
effectively lowers the dispersion degree of the strategies of rational individuals
but has little impact on the dispersion degree of the strategies of momentum
traders.
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Figure 5: The standard deviation σg of individual strategies as a function of the market
impact β for (a) the rational individuals and γ=0 (circles), 0.2 (squares), 0.8 (triangles); (b)
the momentum traders and γ=0.2 (squares), 0.8 (triangles), 1.0 (stars). Other parameters
are: the total number of individuals N = 1001, the memory size m = 5, the updating
threshold Dth = 0, the drift of strategy λ = 0.1, the exponent ξ = 1, the constant η = 10.
Final results are averaged over 100 runs and 104 times after 105 relaxation times in each
run.
Figure 6 (a) and (b) further show the strategy distributions for β = 0
and β = 1 respectively. It is noted that, for β = 0, the existence of momen-
tum traders leads to an increase in the number of individuals adopting the
trend-following strategy, i.e. g > 0.5. The strategy distributions of rational
individuals and momentum traders are the same. For β = 1, the existence
of momentum traders suppresses rational individual’s trend-following strat-
egy. Rational individual’s trend-rejecting strategy coexists with momentum
trader’s trend-following strategy.
Comparing the results in fig. 3 with the results in fig. 5 and fig. 6, we find
that the impact of momentum traders on σp is closely related to the impact
of momentum traders on σg. Within the range of γ < 0.5, an increase in
γ has little impact on σg and σp. Within the range of γ > 0.5, an increase
in γ leads to a decrease in σg and an increase in σp. Such a result implies
that the price fluctuation should be determined by the strategy distribution
of rational individuals. A U-like strategy distribution is beneficial to the
suppression of price fluctuation. A narrower strategy distribution leads to
a large price fluctuation. Both the trend-following and trend-rejecting herd
behaviors can result in large price fluctuations. The coexistence of the trend-
following and trend-rejecting behaviors can suppress the price fluctuations.
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Figure 6: (a) The strategy distribution P (g) of rational individuals for β=0 and γ=0
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times after 105 relaxation times in each run.
12
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
2e+05
4e+05
6e+05
8e+05
1e+06
  =0.0
  =0.2
  =0.8
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
-2e+06
-1e+06
0
1e+06
2e+06
  =0.2
  =0.8
  =1.0
β
W
(a) (b)
γ
γ
γ
γ
γ
γ
rational individual momentum trader
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The evolution of individual strategies is governed by the gains and loses in
the investment. In fig. 7 we plot the average wealth W¯ of rational individuals
and momentum traders as a function of the market impact β for different
ratio of momentum traders γ. Within the range of β < 0.5, the existence of
momentum traders leads to an increase in W¯ , whether the individuals are
rational individuals or momentum traders. Within the range of β > 0.5, the
average wealth of momentum traders decreases while the average wealth of
rational individual increases with the rise of γ.
Comparing the results in fig. 6 with those in fig. 7, we find a self-
reinforcing feedback loop within the range of β < 0.5. Due to the existence
of momentum traders, the trend-followers are more possible to be in the
majority side and earn more, which in turn attracts more rational individ-
uals to adopt the trend-following strategy and the trend-following strategy
becomes a dominant strategy. However, Within the range of β > 0.5, the
above self-reinforcing feedback loop does not exist. On the contrary, a neg-
ative feedback loop is found. Due to the existence of momentum traders,
the trend-followers are more possible to be in the majority side and suffer a
lose, which in turn cause the rational individuals to reject the trend-following
strategy and the trend-rejecting strategy becomes a dominant strategy for
rational individuals. Due to an increase in the number of rational individuals,
the trend-rejectors are more possible to be in the majority side and suffer a
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loss, which in turn cause the momentum traders to adopt the trend-following
strategy and the trend-following strategy becomes a dominant strategy for
momentum traders. The rational individuals clustering around gi ∼ 0 cou-
pled with the momentum traders clustering around gi ∼ 1 becomes stable.
4. Theoretical analysis
4.1. The evolutionary dynamics of self-reinforcing feedback loop in the present
model
In the present model, the self-reinforcing feedback loop is observed only
when the market impact is low. In the following, we give a theoretical analysis
on the self-reinforcing feedback mechanism for β = 0.
Consider the case γ = 0. As what has been discussed in ref. [15], the evo-
lutionary mechanism is satisfied with the majority game mechanism, where
the individuals in the majority side will win the game.
In order to understand the evolutionary mechanism of individual strate-
gies, we can divide them into three categories: g < 0.5; g = 0.5; g > 0.5.
If all the individuals adopt the g < 0.5 strategies, the trend-rejectors should
be in the majority side. They will get a net benefit and the g < 0.5 strate-
gies become stable. If all the individuals adopt the g > 0.5 strategies, the
trend-followers should be in the majority side. They will get a net bene-
fit and the g > 0.5 strategies become stable. If all the individuals adopt
the g = 0.5 strategy, it is a random case whether the trend-rejectors or the
trend-followers are in the majority side. Each one is quite possible to suffer
a loss and the g = 0.5 strategy is unstable. If half of the individuals adopt
the g < 0.5 strategies and another half of the individuals adopt the g > 0.5
strategies, it is also a random case similar to the case for g = 0.5. Therefore,
the probability that the system evolves to the state where all the individu-
als adopt the g < 0.5 strategies is equal to the probability that the system
evolves to the state where all the individuals adopt the g > 0.5 strategies.
As the momentum traders are incorporated into the evolutionary process,
the game is also satisfied with the majority game mechanism but the system
is more possible to evolve to the state where all the individuals adopt the g >
0.5 strategies. The difference between the probability that all the individuals
adopt the g > 0.5 strategies and the probability that all the individuals adopt
the g < 0.5 strategies is
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p′ =
∑
0≤m′,n′≤N−γN
2
;m′+n′≥N−2γN
2
(N−γN
2
m′
)(N−γN
2
n′
)
g′
N−γN
2
+m′−n′(1−g′)
N−γN
2
−m′+n′,
(7)
in which g′ belongs to [0, 0.5] and m′ and n′ are the numbers of individuals
following the trend with probability g′ and 1− g′ respectively. For example,
suppose N = 3 and γN = 1, p′ becomes
p′ =
∑
0≤m′,n′≤1;m′+n′≥ 1
2
g′1+m
′−n′(1−g′)1−m
′+n′ = g′2+(1−g′)2+g′(1−g′). (8)
From the above equation we find that the probability that all the indi-
viduals adopt the g > 0.5 strategies increases with the rise of γ while the
probability that all the individuals adopt the g < 0.5 strategies decreases
with the rise of γ, which is in accordance with the simulation results in fig.
6 (a) and (b).
4.2. The evolutionary dynamics of negative feedback loop in the present
model
In the present model, the negative feedback loop is observed only when
the market impact is high. In the following, we give a theoretical analysis on
the negative feedback mechanism for β = 1.
Consider the case γ = 0. As what has been discussed in ref. [15], the evo-
lutionary mechanism is satisfied with the minority game mechanism, where
the individuals in the minority side will win the game. The functional form
of strategy distribution P (g) is determined by the winning probability τ(g)
[21],
P (g) ∝
1
1
2
− τ(g)
, (9)
in which τ(g) ∼ 1
2
− 1√
N
g(1 − g). For g = 0 and g = 1, τ(g) reaches
its maximum value τ(0) = τ(1) = 1
2
. Therefore, a U-shape distribution
clustering around g = 0 and g = 1 is stable.
As the momentum traders are incorporated into the evolutionary process,
the game is also satisfied with the minority game mechanism. If a continuous
rise or a continuous fall of the prices does not occur, all the individuals behave
15
like rational individuals. A U-shape distribution clustering around g = 0 and
g = 1 is also stable.
If a continuous rise or a continuous fall of the prices occurs, i.e. ↑↑↑ or
↓↓↓ occurs, the g = 1 strategy of rational individuals will be suppressed. For
example, suppose originally half of the individuals adopt the g = 0 strategy
and another half of the individuals adopt the g = 1 strategy, among which
the ratio of rational individuals is equal to the ratio of momentum traders.
Facing the ↑↑↑ (↓↓↓) history, nearly half of the rational individuals buy the
stock while another half of the rational individuals sell the stock, but all
the momentum traders buys (sells) the stock. The price rises (falls) and the
rational individuals following the rising (falling) trend lose the game. The
g = 1 strategy will be updated and the ratio of rational individuals adopting
the g = 1 strategy decreases. Therefore, the rational individuals adopting
the g = 0 strategy should be more than the rational individuals adopting the
g = 1 strategy.
If a continuous rise or a continuous fall of the prices occasionally dis-
appears, the g = 0 strategy of momentum traders will be suppressed. For
example, suppose originally half of the momentum traders adopt the g = 0
strategy and another half of the momentum traders adopt the g = 1 strat-
egy. Facing the latest history, half of the momentum traders buy the stock
and another half of the momentum traders sell the stock. Because most of
the rational individuals reject the trend, the momentum traders rejecting the
trend will be in the majority size and lose the game. The g = 0 strategy will
be updated and the ratio of momentum traders adopting the g = 0 strategy
decreases. Therefore, the momentum traders adopting the g = 1 strategy
should be more than the momentum traders adopting the g = 0 strategy.
From the above analysis we find that, for β = 1, the system will finally
evolve to the state where the rational individuals with a dominant strategy
g = 0 coexist with the momentum traders with a dominant strategy g = 1,
which is in accordance with the simulation results in fig. 6 (c) and (d).
5. Summary
By incorporating market impact and momentum traders into an agent-
based model, we have investigated the conditions for the occurrence of self-
reinforcing feedback loops in financial markets. We focus on the coupling
effect of market impact and momentum traders on the price fluctuations and
the evolution of strategies.
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The effect of momentum traders on the evolution of stock prices is closely
related to the market impact. As the market impact is low, the existence of
momentum traders has little effect on the change of price fluctuations. As
the market impact is high, the existence of momentum traders can effectively
lead to an increase in price fluctuations.
The self-reinforcing feedback loop only exists within the range where the
market impact is low, where the herd behavior is beneficial to the investors.
Due to the existence of momentum traders, the trend-followers are more
possible to be in the majority side and earn more, which in turn causes
the trend-following strategy to become the dominant strategy. Within the
range where the market impact is high, the self-reinforcing feedback loop
does not exist while the negative feedback loop is observed. Due to the
existence of momentum traders, the trend-followers suffer a great lose, which
in turn results in such a scenario where the momentum traders adopting the
trend-following strategy coexist with the rational individuals adopting the
trend-rejecting strategy.
Some empirical findings indicate that the momentum strategy helps the
investors earn more while other empirical findings indicate that the momen-
tum strategy causes the investors to suffer a loss. The present work gives
a possible explanation for the coexistence of these contradictory situations.
Some empirical findings tell us that a rational analysis is quite important for
an investor to earn more or reduce the loss. The present model gives a pos-
sible explanation for the evolutionary mechanism through which a rational
individual can earn more and refrain from getting a loss.
The irrational behaviors widely exist in biological and social systems.
Whether they are just a kind of noise or not is a fascinating problem which
can help us understand the evolutionary mechanism of social behaviors. In
the future, the effect of subjective perception on evolutionary dynamics will
be extensively studied in diffusion systems and cooperative systems.
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